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Poland and Spain in Contemporary World

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Poland's Security Policy after the Second World War

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In the nineteenth century Poland did not exist on the map of Europe. For 123 years the country was divided between the partitioning powers - Russia, Prussia and Austria. Twenty years after regaining its independence in 1918, Poland became the object of aggression by Nazi Germany and the Communist Soviet Union. During World War II, Poland was a member of the anti-Hitler coalition, but as a result of the Yalta accord fell within the sphere of influence of the USSR, eventually becoming part of the communist bloc. Its boundaries changed, lands in the East being lost and lands in the West being gained. In terms of geographical area and population, Poland now places eighth in Europe.

Understandably given this historical experience, Poland is particularly sensitive to security issues. Security, as for any other country, is dictated by both internal and external factors. The internal factors are geographical location (between Germany and Russia/the USSR), territory, population size and ethnic composition, economic potential, the size and quality of the armed forces, the quality of leadership and society's ability to accept the costs of ensuring security. External factors, in turn, are alliances, the international situation surrounding the country, which includes other countries' interest in the region, the alignment of Polish interests with the interests of other countries and potential for other countries to affect Poland's security (Kuźniar 2002: 34-35; Żurawski vel Grajewski Przemysław 2012: 396).

This chapter consists of four parts. The first presents Polish security considerations during the Cold War, a period when Poland was in forced alliance with the Soviet Union and belonged to the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, also known as

Comecon). This part will also examine Polish peace initiatives as well as the impact of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The second part will discuss the Polish security policy after 1989 when the Polish geopolitical situation changed radically and the basis for the country's national security became its membership of the North Atlantic Alliance. Poland took up its place alongside the United States in the coalition of states intervening in Iraq. The third part is devoted to Polish position with respect to the Common Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union. Initially sceptical, this position has changed to one whereby Poland has actively participated in the creation of stabilization missions and battle groups as well as initiating action to strengthen the military capabilities of the European Union. The fourth section looks at Poland's security strategy, including perception of threats and how those threats have been responded to, and reforms related to the armed forces. Section four also presents an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats relating to the Polish national security system. The chapter ends with conclusions that may be drawn from its four sections.

1. Security policy during the Cold War

During the Cold War Poland was not an entirely sovereign state. Internally, under the auspices of Moscow power was held by the Communist Party. The government did not represent society, the system was undemocratic and the opposition repressed. Externally Poland was a satellite state of the Soviet Union, its foreign policy subordinated to the interests of a foreign power. Poland's dependence was deepened by its membership of Eastern bloc international organizations. In the economic realm 1949 saw the creation of the CMEA.

In the military sphere functioned the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed in May 1955 and known as the Warsaw Pact. The Warsaw Pact defined itself as a regional organization of collective self-defence in the meaning of the UN Charter. Article 4 provided for immediate assistance in the event of an armed attack, including the use of military force. In accordance with the letter of international law this was a system of collective self-defence, registered with the United Nations and having a clearly defined *casus foederis*, initiating allied operations and joint political and military bodies (Skubiszewski 1959). However, the Warsaw Pact was primarily an instrument to legiti-

mize the stationing of Soviet troops and achieve Soviet interests through forced unity, a doctrine of limited state sovereignty and Russian political, military and diplomatic dictation. It was in fact a military bloc, and not a military alliance of the Western kind, its international legitimacy purely fictitious, and its similarity to NATO superficial.

The main institution was the Political Consultative Committee, comprising Member States' first secretaries of the party, prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs and defence (Nowak, 2011: 51-53). States vied for position within the Pact. For instance, in the 1970s Poland sought to set up a permanent secretariat in Warsaw, an initiative which did not meet with Russian approval. Poland was one of the Northern Group of Forces of the Warsaw Pact, which in the event of war was tasked with attacking the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark.

The decision making process of the Warsaw Pact was completely centralized. Russians assigned tasks to armed forces of member states, and any opposition was ruled out in the name of socialist internationalism. Poland, like other Warsaw Pact countries, did not have its own security strategy. Military doctrine was completely subordinated to the Soviets. The armed forces were part of a greater whole and as such could act only within the operations undertaken and controlled by the Soviet General Staff. Efforts to achieve independence were harshly punished, as evidenced by the Soviet intervention in Budapest in 1956 and the Warsaw Pact countries 1968 intervention in Prague.

The Polish army, the second-largest among the socialist countries, was focused on offense, in 1980 numbering over 400 thousand soldiers, along with 2800 tanks, 2300 guns and 500 aircraft (Balcerowicz 2001: 440-441). This army took part in the military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the suppression of workers' protests in Poland - in June 1956 in Poznan, in December 1970 at the coast in Gdańsk and Szczecin and in December 1981 during martial law.

Poland did, however, put forward significant peace initiatives. At the twelfth session of the General Assembly in 1957, Polish Foreign Minister, Adam Rapacki, announced plans to establish a nuclear-free zone across the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia (Wandycz 1994, Ozinga 1989). Later, in 1963, the Gomulka plan assumed a nuclear arms freeze on the territory of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the two German states. These initiatives, inspired by the Soviet Union, were aimed at strengthening the strategic position of the Socialist camp.

Poland also put forward the idea of convening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From Poland's perspective, this initiative was to contribute to the affirmation of the Oder-Neisse borders and international recognition of the German Democratic Republic, which would also form a security buffer along the western border of the country. For the USSR, the proposal was propaganda meant to improve its image, especially tarnished by the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Adopted in 1976, the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, confirmed the borders within Europe and strengthened the territorial status quo. The socialist states hoped the CSCE would bring about a *détente* and greater international cooperation; Western countries saw in the conference an instrument for putting pressure on respect for human rights in Central and Eastern Europe. The CSCE contributed to the crystallisation of the democratic opposition in Poland, the creation of the Workers' Defence Committee, the Human and Civil Rights Protection Movement and, later on, «Solidarity» (Czaputowicz 2013).

In 1989 came a breakthrough as a result of the agreement between the authorities and the opposition in the so-called "Round Table". The Civic Committee, representing the opposition, defined the main objectives of the Polish nation as ensuring sovereignty as well as political and economic independence. Regaining state sovereignty required a suitable alignment of relations between Warsaw Pact allies on the basis of equality and without ideological sigma. National security was to be ensured through a policy of disarmament and reductions in defence spending – a result of the victory over the Cold War division of Europe, the development of international cooperation based on the principles of the UN and OSCE, and a fuller realization of human rights. Within this view the use of force and interference in the internal affairs of other countries are unacceptable (Czaputowicz 2009: 64-65).

2. Security policy after achievement of independence in 1989

During the Cold War Poland bordered the German Democratic Republic in the west, Czechoslovakia in the south and the Soviet Union in the east. After 1989, a united Germany became Poland's neighbour to the west, the Czech Republic and Slovakia to the south, and to the east, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Russia (Kaliningrad oblast). The primary task of

Polish foreign policy was to regulate relations with all its neighbours via treaty.

The Round Table Agreement defined the institutional form of the state, including the division of powers with respect to security policy. Solidarity's leaders recognized the leading role of the Communist Party on foreign policy and security. General Wojciech Jaruzelski was chosen as President by parliament w którym w wyniku porozumienia przy okrągłym stole komuniści i ich sojusznicy mieli większość zagwarantowaną. As such, General Jaruzelski had a wide range of competences in formulating security policy: he was head of the armed forces and had power to appoint ministers of defence, the interior and foreign affairs, which positions were thus filled respectively by Czesław Kiszczak, Florian Siwicki and Krzysztof Skubiszewski.

The Polish doctrine of Defence of 21 February 1990 still accepted that an important element of Poland's security is membership Warsaw Pact as well as and bilateral and multilateral alliances, the role of which would change over time as a new European security system was formed. This disregard for the impending and inevitable collapse of the Warsaw Pact meant that the doctrine was outdated even at its adoption. It was also mistakenly assumed that there was a continuing threat to national security from Poland being drawn against her will a conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in which nuclear weapons might be used. Combining the old with the new, this doctrine was a document of the transition period (Koziej 2001: 405-406, Minkina 2011: 623-625).

The strategy of the Ministry of Defence of September 1991 was based on the principles of equal security for all states and avoidance of military alliances. As such, it was an "all-azimuth" strategy assuming the need for defence in all directions (Malendowski 1998: 23). The slow pace of change in Polish security policy was a consequence of the Round Table agreement of leaving the military in the hands of the communist forces and the stationing of Soviet troops on Polish territory (Kuźniar 2001: 36).

It seemed that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was particularly well-suited to fulfilling the function of collective security, bringing together states on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and possessing a mandate covering both security and economic issues as well as the so-called "human dimension". The strength of the CSCE was the membership of all states from Vancouver to Vladivostok, its weakness its lack of effectiveness. Adopted on 21 November 1990, "the Paris Charter for a New Europe," proclaimed an end to the division of the

continent and the start of a new era of democracy, peace and unity. This proclamation soon proved to be wishful thinking (Czaputowicz 1998: 92-95). Nevertheless, the process of institutionalization of the CSCE had begun, and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) had been signed. This treaty was to become the basis for the military order on the continent (cf. Żurawski vel Grajewski 1997).

Polish policy towards the Warsaw Pact thus evolved along with the changes in the political situation. First, there was an attempt to transform the character of the Warsaw Pact from military to political. Then there were the so-called "cross-security guarantees" provided by both the Soviet Union and NATO. Finally, along with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, Poland decided to dissolve the Warsaw Pact. This dissolution took place on 1 July 1991, only days after CMEA was disbanded, on 28 June 1991.

In its relations with Germany the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki sought to conclude a treaty confirming Poland's western border. In relations with Russia, the main goal of Polish foreign policy was to transform the existing relationship of dependence into one of equality and partnership. In September 1990 a postulate to withdraw 64 thousand Soviet troops from Polish soil was made (Menkiszak 2001: 129-130). The withdrawal finally began in April 1991, taking until September 1993. A bone of contention in Polish-Russian relations was Russia's demand for assets remaining at Russian bases to be transferred to Polish-Russian joint venture companies. Ultimately, this issue was resolved in Poland's favour (Kostrzewa-Zorbas, 1995). Polish eastern policy was hailed as a two-track policy. This meant simultaneously maintaining good relations with both Moscow, at the heart of the USSR, and the republics (Zielke 1997: 194-196). On 2 December 1991 Poland was the first to recognize the independence of Ukraine, a country crucial to the security of the entire region.

The summit of Polish, Czechoslovakia and Hungary leaders in the Hungarian town of Visegrad in February 1991 gave institutional form to cooperation between the three countries. The Declaration announced the identification of cooperation in political, economic, social and security spheres. Good relations between these countries was proof to western states of their capacity for future cooperation within the structures of an integrating Europe.

NATO was initially seen in Poland and other Central European countries as a Cold War organization that should be dissolved along with the Warsaw Pact and replaced by a pan-European security system set

up on the basis of the CSCE. Among the leadership of the Polish Army, trained in the USSR and not speaking English, there were concerns about whether there was a future with the Polish army.

Following NATO's adoption in November 1991 of the New Strategic Concept, the alliance's relations with the former Warsaw Pact countries gradually began to strengthen. Psychological barriers were broken down and an atmosphere of mutual trust built. This helped to establish cooperation, which was deepened through specific ventures. Poland joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which provided a framework for consultation on political and security issues relating to defense planning, strategy, force structure and command and opened a permanent office at NATO headquarters in Brussels and at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe near Mons (cf. Kupiecki 2001).

The failed coup of Yanayev in Moscow was a signal that the peaceful development of the situation in the Soviet Union was not a foregone conclusion. A belief grew that the OSCE would not be in a position to ensure security. In the new geopolitical situation the government of Jan Olszewski specified NATO membership as a strategic objective. Poland's road to Europe was to lead via NATO and membership of the alliance was in turn to ensure better terms of membership of the European Union. The North Atlantic Alliance was recognized as an essential element of the European security system (Hyde-Price 1995: 242-244; Cottey 1995; Czapotowicz 1997).

In the defence doctrine of 2 November 1992 a change in the threat assessment took place. Due to the dissolution of the USSR and the collapse of the bi-polar system, the threat of global nuclear war was reduced. Now regional conflicts found themselves in first place (e.g. the Balkans) along with non-military threats¹. At the same time membership in the North Atlantic Treaty was defined as an essential strategic objective that would ensure continued national security. Speaking in favour of this approach were the strengthening of Poland's ability to defend itself, a high assessment of the deterrent value of the alliance and strengthening of Poland's image as a state of stable and responsible participant in international relations.

Strategic documents from the 1990s emphasise the view that Poland's place is among the family of countries belonging to Western civilization,

¹ The broad definition of security threat involves action or sequence of events that threaten to short-term quality of life and limit the scope for policy choices by the institutions of a state. The security challenge is a phenomenon which requires the formulation of a response and the undertaking of appropriate action (Czaputowicz 2012: 23).

and that the country was returning to the fold after a half-century of Soviet domination (Siren 2009). Polish aspirations to NATO membership were strongly backed by Germany, seeing for itself enhanced national security and greater stability in its neighbours. In negotiations Poland referred to historical arguments, the necessity of supporting democracy and the norms applying in the alliance, such as the principle of equality and indivisibility of security (Schimmelfenning 2003: 229-236).

For Poland the value of NATO membership was derived from Article 5 of the Washington Treaty - the collective defence of the Member States. However, NATO intervened in 1999 in the former Yugoslavia, which fell outside the scope of the treaty. From Poland's perspective the alliance's participation in expeditionary operations should not be at the expense of its traditional function of defending the territory of its member states. Poland pushed for the even distribution of the defence infrastructure of the alliance and the development of cooperation between NATO and the European Union. American involvement in Europe was seen as a guarantor of security and stability. An important instrument for cementing the partnership with the United States was taking part in foreign missions².

From NATO's perspective, Polish membership of alliance increased its potential in terms of both defence and peacekeeping operations around the world, eliminating the "grey zone" of security in Central Europe which formed after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Poland has contributed extensive knowledge of the issues facing Eastern Europe. As a member of the alliance Poland has consistently advocated an "open-door" policy and supported its eastern neighbours in their efforts to gain membership in the organization (Czaputowicz 1998: 192-197).

Poland took part in the military operations in Iraq in 2003 in order to demonstrate its solidarity within the alliance, thereby strengthening its image as a close ally of the United States. Poland was counted among the states of the "new Europe"; those states striving to maintain close relations with the Americans, in contrast to the "old Europe", those states sceptical of military involvement alongside America³.

² Poland has had a long tradition of participating in UN peacekeeping operations. In the years 1953 to 2007 over 64 000 Polish troops took part in 66 peacekeeping missions.

³ A benchmark for assessing Polish participation in stabilization missions could be Spain, a demographically similar country, although with a larger economy. In the same way added value from Spain's involvement in Iraq was derived from contingents from Spanish-speaking Latin American countries - the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador (Domejko-Kozera 2006: 44-50), so added value might be expected in Polish involvement in the form of the possible participation of the Central European region,

Polish participation in the Iraq operation has been judged as a military success, a political draw and an economic defeat. The Polish military gained valuable experience in logistics, operations and the command of large multinational forces, thus increasing its credibility in the eyes of its allies. Poland's political objectivity and strategic independence have both been strengthened. Action in Iraq brought home the need for a fully professional army and accelerated armed forces reforms. The disparities between countries against the background of intervention in Iraq has shown that NATO is unable to take joint action in the event of differences of interest between members. This has resulted in greater attention being paid to Poland's capacity to act independently in a crisis. At the same time hope that involvement in Iraq alongside the United States would bring a "strategic partnership" between the two countries and increased American presence on Polish soil proved unrealistic. The negative effects include the weakening of NATO's cohesion due to discord among members over the legitimacy of the intervention in Iraq. Neither has Poland achieved its economic goals in the form of contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq (Koziej 2012b: 37-38; Czaputowicz 2004: 20-22).

Concern for the future of NATO has led the Polish authorities to transfer military involvement in Iraq to Afghanistan. The participation of a 1200-strong Polish contingent in the NATO-led operation has been seen as a long-term investment in the country's security. Also noted has been the fact that the Alliance has been involved in operations of a pre-emptive - and so offensive - nature, which from Poland's perspective has been unfavourable, since it has led member states to develop expeditionary capabilities substantially different from the capabilities necessary for collective defence against external aggression (Balcerowicz, 2011: 141 -14).

3. Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy

At the close of the 1990s and the start of the new century Poles were sceptical about European cooperation in security and defence. In the strategic dimension there was "an instinctive Atlanticism" regardless of which party was in power. Because of its pro-Americanism, Poland has been referred to

and so the Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), the Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), Ukraine and Romania (Zurawski vel Grajewski 2010: 131). With regard for its own security, Spain has focused more on developing of its air transport and satellite capabilities. In 2001 Poland purchased from Spain seven medium-sized CASA C-295M transport aircraft.

as the “Trojan horse of America”. The intention announced in Helsinki in 1999 to create a European intervention force was met with Polish reserve. It was feared that a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) could lead to a weakening of ties between Europe and the United States and undermine NATO. Poland’s attitude to the ESDP was also affected by the fact that the country had already been a member of NATO and did not accede to the European Union until 1 May 2004.

Scepticism regarding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) resulted from the weakness of European military institutions and the fear of duplicating NATO structures. Poland proposed strengthening transatlantic ties as an alternative to creating the EU security institutions (Osica 2001: 14; Zaborowski 2004: 18). Polish representatives at the European Convention criticized the creation of a “two-speed Europe” in the field of security, arguing that the ESDP should be part of a broader transatlantic security system, in which NATO played the main role (Miszczak 2007: 17).

From the perspective of Poland the 2003 European Security Strategy was too focused on new security threats which were important for Western countries, at the expense of traditional military threats relevant to the countries of Central Europe. The Poles proposed recognising NATO as the main security institution in continental Europe, and Russia as a potential partner in the cooperation, but also as a potential source of instability. They were sceptical about the possibility of achieving “effective multilateralism”, acknowledging that the European Union should be able to conduct operations without the need for UN Security Council authorization, which could be vetoed. Poland proposed to take account of traditional security threats, including the “frozen conflicts” in Eastern Europe. Poland did not agree to the mention of Ukraine alongside Belarus as a potential source of threat (Osica 2004).

Perceptions of European cooperation in the field of security and defence changed after Poland’s accession to the European Union. In 2004, 77 per cent of Poles believed that the European Union should have its own military force with which to defend its own interests (Longhurst, Zaborowski 2007: 54). Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski proposed a one hundred thousand-strong European army, which would work closely with NATO, but this initiative did not meet the approval of other European states (Spinant, Taylor 2006).

In 2008 the transatlantic direction of Polish security policy was still dominant (Madej, Terlikowski 2009: 45-46). A change took place in this

respect due to the fall in U.S. engagement in European security, President Obama's announcement of a "reset" policy towards Russia, and difficulties in deployment of the U.S. missile defence shield (cf. Piątkowski 2008: 142-146). However, Russian aggression against Georgia in August 2008 had a significant impact on new Polish thinking about security policy. This aggression was not met with a strong response from the United States or the European Union, who instead wished to avoid jeopardizing relations with Russia. It turned out that Georgia's good relations with the United States and application for NATO membership did nothing to secure it against aggression; in fact the opposite was true: they had magnified the threat (cf. Karagiannis 2013). The credibility of U.S. security guarantees for the states of Central Europe, including Poland had been seriously undermined (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2010: 131). From the energy security perspective, the gas pipeline built by Russia and Germany under the Baltic Sea also had negative effect.

Polish involvement in the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was a result its efforts to extend security guarantees for fear of U.S. withdrawal from Europe (O'Donnell, 2012: 1). As the sixth largest country in the European Union, Poland is ranked fifth in terms of participation in EU operations. Four hundred Polish soldiers took part in the EUFOR mission in Chad and the Central African Republic, the aim of which was to ensure the safety of refugees from Darfur. One hundred and thirty Poles took part in the EUFOR in Congo, 277 in Operation Althea, and 17 in Concordia (Estimates... 2009: 414). By sending troops into conflict zones, Poland ceased to be merely a consumer of security, and became a producer (Longhurst 2003: 50-63). Participation in stabilization missions is also contributing to the modernization of the Polish armed forces, including reform of their structure and organization, professionalization and improving combat readiness (Górka -Winter 2007: 268-270).

During work on the report on implementation of the European Security Strategy in 2008, Poland commented on security challenges originating in Russia, energy security, EU rapid response capability, civilian-military cooperation, the Eastern Partnership, and possible solutions to the Georgian crisis (Chappell 2012: 128-129). Within the framework of the European Defence Agency, Poland co-authored a plan to develop the European Union's defence capabilities as well as strategic documents concerning cooperation in the field of armaments and integration of the European defence industry.

Poland was one of the countries to give direction to the work to establish EU battle groups, whose task it is to face the growing security challenges in the neighbourhood of the European Union. Poland participates in three combat groups. In 2006, a battle group, which saw duty in the first half of 2010, was established under an agreement between Poland, Germany, Slovakia, Lithuania and Latvia. Poland was the so-called "framework nation", with responsibility for the functioning of the group, organization, training and leadership (it was located in Potsdam, Germany.). Poland provided 50 per cent of the group in the form the 17th Wielkopolska Mechanized Brigade, which had served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Germany provided 30 per cent of the force's strength, leading in logistics and medical support. Slovakia and Lithuania contributed 200 personnel and Latvia 60 (Terlikowski 2010: 1).

The "Weimar Battle Group" is a result of the 2006 agreement between France, Germany and Poland. Here Poland is also the framework nation, and provides equipment in the form of a mechanized battalion and operational command. Germany provides logistical support, and France medical. The Weimar Battle Group was activated in mid-2013. There are plans to transform the group into a larger, permanent and more flexible unit with suitable military and civilian capabilities. Logistics support for ESDP operations required the creation of integrated C3 capabilities (command, control and communications) (Dickow, Linnenkamp, Maulny, Terlikowski 2011: 7-8).

Poland is additional a framework nation for the Visegrad Battle Group, formed together with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Central European states share a similar culture and a similar strategic perception of security threats. Earlier Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland formed a multi-national brigade (Tarasovič 2011: 70-71). The Polish contingent will number 950 troops, the Czech force 750, while Hungarians and Slovaks will provide 400 each. The group is planned to be operational in the first half of 2016.

The Polish Defence Strategy states that ESDP contributes to peace, stability and prosperity of the Member States of the European Union and its neighbours (Defence Strategy ... 2009). Strengthening the EU's civil and military capabilities was one of the tasks of Poland's Presidency of the Council of Europe in the second half of 2011. Poland sought to improve the instruments for raising forces for a mission, strengthen planning and command structures, create permanent operational headquarters in Brussels (Operational Headquarters - OHQ) and build capacity through

pooling and sharing. The strategy also emphasized the need to maintain the integrity of ESDP activities with those of the North Atlantic Alliance as well as the need to develop cooperation with immediate neighbours. From the Polish perspective the weakness of EU security policy is the lack of strategy towards Russia.

4. Poland's security policy in strategic documents

Polish security depends on the situation in the Central and Eastern Europe region. Poland's neighbours to the west and south are stable - Poland shares borders with countries belonging to NATO and the European Union, thus, Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The challenges to Polish security come from the East. The independence and stability of Ukraine are essential for the safety of Poland and any armed conflict involving this country would constitute a serious challenge. Belarus is heavily dependent on Russia and its undemocratic nature gives cause for concern. The Baltic states, meaning the directly bordering Poland Lithuania as well as Latvia and Estonia, are Poland's allies, members of the European Union and NATO. To the North-East Poland directly borders Russia (the Kaliningrad oblast) whose policy in recent years could constitute a challenge to Polish security. Further away, but still in the vicinity, lie Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, an area of frozen conflicts (Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh), which could spark war. Poland thus has a strong interest in stability and democratization in the region (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2012: 394-402).

The National Security Strategy of 13 November 2007 broadly defines national security to include military, political, social and environmental questions. It was judged that the likelihood of large-scale armed conflict is currently limited. The challenge is, however, the dependence of the Polish economy on imported Russian energy resources. The strategy expressed readiness to send Polish forces to participate in stabilization missions and peacekeeping and humanitarian operations outside Poland's borders (National Security Strategy ... 2007: 23). The optimal level of commitment abroad is 3,200 to 3,800 soldiers, which would allow Poland to achieve its objectives without weakening of the country's defensive capabilities (Strategy of Participation ... 2009, Pietrzak 2012: 75).

The Polish army performs defensive and expeditionary roles that are partially complementary and partially competing. The former role requires a sufficient saturation of weapons to effectively combat the tanks

and warplanes of Poland's Eastern neighbours. The latter role requires the development of the capacity to respond rapidly in distant conflict zones (patrol vehicles and aircraft transport).

In accordance with *the Program to Professionalize the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland for the Years 2008-2010*, Poland abandoned national service and converted to an entirely professional army, thereby increasing its capacity to participate in foreign missions. Polish Army is creating a force of one hundred thousand regular troops and 20 thousand reservists. Poland is one of only a few countries that, despite the financial crisis, have maintained their military budget: defence spending in 2010 amounted to USD 8.43 billion (1.8 per cent of GDP), in 2011, USD 9.43 billion (1.82 per cent of GDP) and in 2012, USD 10.43 billion (1.98 per cent of GDP).

According to the *Strategy for the development of the national security system for the years 2012-2022* Polish security environment is determined by four factors: NATO, the European Union, relations with the United States and relations with Russia. NATO remains the chief guarantor of Poland's security; the challenge for Polish security policy is to keep its allies interested in the function of collective defence. A threat to the European Union is the Eurozone financial crisis, and the challenges include the renewal and strengthening of the Common Security and Defence Policy, maintaining U.S. military involvement in Europe and building a system of cooperative security and partnership between NATO and Russia and Poland and Russia. Internally, threat come from the deterioration of Poland's infrastructure and demographics, including the emigration of the young generation of Poles. In terms of energy security, the exploitation of Polish shale gas presents an opportunity (Strategiczny... 2012: 8).

The probability of armed aggression on territory of Poland is small, but the use of force in Poland's neighbourhood cannot be ruled out. The priorities for the modernization of the Polish armed forces that emerge from this assessment are expansion of reconnaissance and command systems, air defence, especially anti-missile capability, and increasing troop mobility by the of helicopters (Aspekty... 2012: 52)⁴.

In times of crisis the interests of particular states will prevail over the interests of the Community. The threats that affect Polish national security

⁴ Poland plans to spend PLN 900 million on modernizing its Navy, giving by 2030 twenty new ships, ten An-28 aircraft, 13 helicopters and six unmanned reconnaissance drones. Some commentators argue that developing the navy based around the Baltic Sea is irrational, as it would be cheaper to combat the enemy ships with aircraft and mainland-based missiles (Żurawski vel Grajewski 2010: 117).

in the twenty-first century include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, threats from cyberspace and organized crime. The United Nations system and arms control regimes may weaken. A serious challenge is posed by the need to ensure that energy supplies remain accessible. A weakness of the Polish security system is the civil defence system and the low defensive capability of Polish society (*Strategia...* 2012: 10, 32). The strengths and weaknesses of the Polish security system are presented below in a SWOT analysis.

Table 1. SWOT analysis of the Polish national security system

Strengths	Weaknesses
<p>Active participation and greater effectiveness in achieving Poland's priorities within NATO and the European Union</p> <p>Professionalization of the Polish Armed Forces</p> <p>Training of personnel; experience gained in missions abroad</p> <p>Prestige of military service in Polish society</p>	<p>A departmentalised approach to security</p> <p>Insufficient saturation of modern weapons</p> <p>Only partial interoperability with the forces of allies</p> <p>Lack of regular military exercises, and inadequate protection of critical infrastructure</p>
Opportunities	Threats
<p>Confirmation in NATO's strategy of the priority of collective defence and contingency planning</p> <p>Increase in the presence of allied defence infrastructure</p> <p>Development of ESDP in order to obtain additional security guarantees</p> <p>Verification of weaponry during overseas operations</p> <p>Increase the effectiveness of international law with respect to non-proliferation of WMD</p>	<p>Persistence of the international threats and challenges</p> <p>Fall in defence spending in comparison with other countries</p> <p>Falling societal acceptance of participation in foreign missions</p> <p>Technological and economic barriers to Polish defence industry limiting the opportunities for cooperation</p>

Source: *Strategia...* 2012: 52.

The strategy puts forward a balance of internationalization and increased Polish independence in security, which *de facto* means a greater than hitherto focus on ensuring defence self-sufficiency and maintaining a state of readiness, ability and determination to independently providing defence for the state against potential external aggression. Of particular importance to a frontier state such as Poland is the ability to counter a surprise attack. The locating of allies' interests in Poland is also important since it increases the probability of obtaining support if the interests of such allies were threatened (Strategiczny. .. 2012: 6-7).

The best solution from the perspective of Polish security would be to create a defensive union through enhanced European integration. This vision, however, is currently unachievable due to differences of interests among Member States and the lack of a shared European strategic culture. It would be useful to supplement the European Union with NATO to create a synergy effect. The European Union, which has economic instruments at its disposal, could improve its defensive potential while an alliance having military capabilities could perform planning roles and conduct operations (Koziej 2012B: 36-37, 43). It is hard, though, to expect such a division of roles to be approved by all European Union Member States.

5. Conclusions

Polish security policy after the Second World War travelled a road from strategic incapacitation within the Warsaw Pact to strategic independence and equal membership of NATO and the European Union (Koziej 2012a: 30). During the Cold War, Poland was a member of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The chief risk was of conflict of NATO, perhaps even nuclear. After 1989, the situation changes diametrically. Poland joined NATO and the European Union and the security challenge become regional conflicts and asymmetric threats coming from the East (see Table 2)⁵.

⁵ Under communism, one third of Poland's trade was with the USSR, one third with other Comecon countries and one third by other countries. At the turn of twenty first century this structure was turned on its head: one third of trade was accounted for by Germany, one third by other EU countries, and one third to other countries (Kuzniar 2002: 33).

Table 2. Instruments of Polish security policy

	"Cold War"	End of Twentieth Century/ Beginning of Twentieth Century
Military alliance	Warsaw Pact	NATO
Economic organisation	Comecon	European Union
Threats	Conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact	Diffuse and asymmetric regional conflicts
Origin of threats	from the West	from the East

Source: author's own work.

In the 90s Poland achieved strategic independence. This required a break with its previous role as executor of tasks coming from outside, and basing strategic culture on its own national interests. The Polish republic's political and strategic defence directive was implemented and ties between Poland and the Soviet Union broken. The Warsaw Pact was dissolved, as was Comecon. Relations with Germany, Russia and other neighbours have been regulated through treaties and the previous hierarchical relations between Moscow and its satellites were replaced by horizontal relations between the states of Central Europe.

Poland advocated the creation of a collective security system, an expression of which was the transformation of doctrine from one of war to one of self-defence. Immediately after 1989, it seemed that the organization on which the international order would rest would be the CSCE. Then, the main objective of the Polish security policy was NATO membership and of the European Union (respectively happening in 1999 and 2004).

Polish security policy at the beginning of the twenty-first century was affected by the changes in the international environment after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Poland earned its own strategic subjectivity and consolidated its strategic position in the security structures of NATO and the European Union. Reform of the armed forces and the security

system took place, adapting them to NATO and the European Union standards (Koziej 2012a: 19-20; Koziej 2012B: 19). Poland took a pro-American stance, took part in resolving the conflict in Iraq, reinforcing its image as a close ally of the United States.

Initially Poland was sceptical of the ESDP. This scepticism arose from fears that the ESDP would lead to a weakening and duplication of NATO structures. The country advocated maintaining a contingency planning and conducting regular military exercises. After joining the European Union in 2004 Poland saw that the ESDP could in fact contribute to the nation's security, especially as U.S. involvement on the continent was shrinking. Poland actively participated in missions to solve crises in Africa and in the creation of the EU battle groups. During its Presidency of the European Union in the second half of 2011, it initiated a talks on strengthening the ESDP by creating a planning and command structures. Strengthening the ESDP is considered by Poland as an additional guarantee of its security.

Involvement in stabilization missions contributed to the modernization and professionalization of the Polish armed forces. The defence budget, unlike that of other European Union member states, has not been significantly hit by the financial crisis. From the Polish perspective the best solution would be to build the EU's crisis resolution capacity while maintaining NATO's responsibility defending members of the alliance against military aggression.

As a frontier state of NATO and the European Union, Poland is particularly sensitive to threats from the East, a region where democracy is not deeply rooted, and conflicts are frozen (Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh). Russia's actions in the immediate vicinity, such as the war with Georgia in August 2008 and the gas blackmail against Ukraine in 2009, cause disquiet in Poland and led to a Polish focus on developing self-defence capabilities. This focus may constrain Poland's involvement on expeditionary operations beyond its borders.

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